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Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006)
Lila Haughey*
The Florida legislature enacted the Opportunity Scholarship Program
(OSP) in 2002 to improve the quality of education in Florida, allowing
students at failing public schools to either attend another public school or
use state funds to enroll at a private school.' Florida public school parents
and several organizations challenged the constitutionality of the OSP,2 and
the trial court found the OSP facially unconstitutional under article IX, § 1
of the Florida Constitution.3 On appeal, the Florida First District Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded the trial court's decision, holding that the
trial court erred in finding the OSP unconstitutional.4 After a second

* To my parents, family, and fiancd, thank you for all your encouragement, guidance, and
love.
1. See Law of May 16, 2002, ch. 2002-387, § 103, 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 387 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005)), invalidatedby Bush v. Holmes (Holmes 111), 919 So.
2d 392 (Fla. 2006). Specifically, the statute states in its most pertinent part, "[t]he Legislature
further finds that a student should not be compelled, against the wishes of the student's parent, to
remain in a school found by the state to be failing for 2 years in a 4-year period." Id. Additionally,
"[t]he Legislature shall make available opportunity scholarships in order to give parents the
opportunity for their children to attend a public school that is performing satisfactorily or to attend
an eligible private school .... Id.
2. See Bush v. Holmes (Holmes II1), 919 So. 2d 392, 398-99 (Fla. 2006).
3. See Bush v. Holmes (Holmes 1), 767 So. 2d 668, 673 (Fla. I st DCA 2000). Article IX,
§ 1(a) states:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision
for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision
shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and
for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions ofhigher learning
and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1(a). Petitioners also challenged the OSP under article I, § 3 and article IX,

§ 6 of the Florida Constitution, and under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Holmes I, 767 So. 2d at 671.
4. Id. at 677. The First District Court of Appeal stated that "[njothing in that... provision"
prevented the legislature from acting the way it did. Id. The court also declined to "consider the
alternative constitutional arguments asserted by [A]ppellees." Id. The Florida Supreme Court
denied a discretionary appeal. Id. While the case was pending on remand, the United States
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appeal,5 the First District Court of Appeal certified a question to the
Florida Supreme Court: "Does the Florida Opportunity Scholarship
Program, § 229.0537, Florida Statutes (1999), violate article I, § 3 of the
Florida Constitution?" 6 On de novo review, the Florida Supreme Court
found the OSP unconstitutional and HELD: The OSP violated article IX,
§ 1 of the Florida Constitution.7
Article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution declares that "[a]dequate
provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and
high quality system of free public schools .. .."'Historically, Florida

Supreme Court held that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program, a program similar to the OSP,
was constitutional under the Establishment Clause. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
662-63 (2002). As a result, "[P]laintiffs voluntarily dismissed their challenges under the
Establishment Clause ...and under article IX, § 6 of the Florida Constitution," leaving only their
claim under article I, § 3 of the Florida Constitution remaining. Bush v. Holmes (Holmes I1), 886
So. 2d 340,345 (Fla. Ist DCA 2004) (en banc), affdon other grounds,919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
5. Holmes II, 886 So. 2d at 343. On remand, the trial court entered final summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, finding that the OSP violated article I, § 3. Id.Defendants appealed. Id. at 340.
A divided First District panel affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 343. The First District Court
of Appeal then withdrew its panel opinion and reheard the issue en banc. Id.On rehearing, the First
District affirmed the final summary judgment of the trial court and held that the OSP violated
article I, § 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id.
6. Id.at 367.
7. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 400. The court also found that the OSP statute violated a
requirement of the Florida Constitution that free education be provided through a system of free
public schools, and that the OSP did not fall within an exception for "other public education
programs." Id.at 411 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a)). The court declined to consider the
constitutionality of the OSP under article 1, § 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id.at 413.
8. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). Section 1(a) states in pertinent part:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision
for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision
shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and
for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions ofhigher learning
and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.
Id.In 1998, the Constitutional Revision Committee proposed an amendment to the 1968 version
of article IX, § 1 in order to clarify the meaning of "adequacy" within the text. See Holmes III, 919
So. 2d at 403. The text of the 1968 article read, "Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, maintenance and operation of
institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may
require." Id.(quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968) (amended 1998)). The revisions added the
following language, "[t]he education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State
of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders."Id. (emphasis omitted). Instead of"[a]dequate
provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools ..." the new language
added, "[aldequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
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courts have struggled to define the terms "adequate" and "uniform" central
to the scope of article IX, § 1 and, as a result, the court has vested the
Florida Legislature with broad authority to provide for an adequate and
uniform education system.9
In School Board of Escambia County v. Florida,"° for example, the
Florida Supreme Court examined the constitutional requirement for a
uniform system as required by article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution."
In particular, the court considered whether the "uniformity" clause
"prohibit[ed] a disparity in the number of school board members from
'2
district to district throughout the State."'
The court examined case law to determine the significance of the
uniformity clause within article IX, § 1.13 Recognizing the lack of
authority on the subject,'4 the Florida Supreme Court crafted a simple and

quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education...."
Id. This language addressed the essential components of adequacy that had been questioned by
courts in a previous case. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680
So. 2d 400,406-07 (Fla. 1996). See generally Jon Mills & Timothy Mclendon, Setting a Standard
for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make "Adequate Provision"
for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REv. 329 (2000) (summarizing the case law interpreting the
meaning of the education article).
9. See, e.g., Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406 (discussing case law on the definition of "uniform");
Scavella v. Sch. Rd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095, 1099 (Fla. 1978); Sch. Rd. of Escambia
County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 836-37 (Fla. 1977) (discussing existing authority interpreting the
uniform phrase).
10. 353 So. 2d 834.
11. Id.at 836.
12. Id. The 1976 Florida Legislature had passed a special act that, interalia, increased the
membership of the school board from five to seven members. Id.at 835.
13. Id.at 836-37.
at 836. The court found only four cases "construing the significance of the phrase
14. See id.
'uniform system of free public schools,' as it appear[ed] in Article IX, § 1 of the Florida
Constitution." Id. The four cases considered by the court were State ex rel. Glover v. Holbrook, 176
So. 99 (1937), finding that a special act establishing teachers' tenure of employment did not violate
the uniform system requirement where the act limited the trustees in Orange County in employment
matters, whereas similar officials in all other counties were not so limited; State ex. rel. v.
Henderson, 188 So. 351 (Fla. 1939), concluding that the application of the homestead exemption
to the school tax levied by a Special Tax School District was not an assessment for special
benefits because the tax was levied to support the establishment and liberal maintenance of a
"uniform system to promote education and good citizenship"; State v. Bd.of Pub. Instruction of
Pasco County, 176 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1965), upholding the constitutionality of a special act creating
a special school taxing district within Pasco County, Florida, against an attack that it violated the
provisions of the 1885 forerunner of article IX, § I of the Florida Constitution; and Dist. Sch. Bd
of Lee County v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973), stating that the Minimum Foundation
Program meets the constitutional requirement of a uniform system of free public
education by providing for a uniform expenditure per teaching unit throughout the State regardless
of the tax base of the various counties.
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broad definition of uniformity. 5 Specifically, the court stated that "a
uniform system results when the constituent parts, although unequal in
number, operate subject to a common plan or serve a common purpose."' 6
Applying this analysis of "uniformity" to the composition of school
boards, the court noted the importance of reflecting the diverse cultural
composition of Florida and, therefore, found no compelling reason to have
identical numbers of school board members.17 As a result, the court held
that the special act increasing the size of the school board did not violate
8
the uniformity clause of article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution.
Continuing the Escambia court's broad interpretation of language in
the education article, the court in Scavella v. School Board of Dade
County 9 considered the constitutionality of a cap on district funding for
the education of an exceptional student 2 at a private school.21 In Scavella,
the court was concerned with the adequacy and quality of the facilities and
programs available for exceptional students at certain public schools.22
The Scavella court noted that article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution
required the Florida Legislature "to provide for'a uniform system of [f]ree
public schools."' 23 However, rather than concentrating on the "uniform
system" requirement, the court focused exclusively on the language of the
clause determining that "Florida residents ha[d] [a] right to attend [the]
public school system for free."2 4 To preserve this right to a free, high-

15. See Sch. Bd.of Escambia County, 353 So. 2d at 838; see also Mills & Mclendon, supra
note 8, at 355 (stating that Florida courts have concluded that uniformity does not require that the
state provide equal service or spending to each student).
16. Sch. Bd.ofEscambia County, 353 So. 2d at 838.
17. Id. The court reasoned that boards in excess of five members would facilitate diverse
representation in urban areas. Id. The court noted, "just as there need not be uniformity of physical
plant and curriculum from county to county because their requirements differ, there is no
compelling reason for school boards of identical size from county to county." Id.
18. Id.
19. 363 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1978).
20. See id.at 1098 (defining "exceptional student" as a student with a physical handicap).
21. See id. at 1097. The statute at issue authorized public school funds to allow physically
handicapped students to attend private schools when their public school district lacked the facilities,
staff or resources to meet their special needs. Id. In particular, the court was concerned with
whether the statutory funding cap deprived exceptional children "of [any right, not just their right
to be treated equally before the law." Id. at 1097-98. The paragraph that was the subject of the
appeal read: "The district school board shall establish a maximum amount which can be paid by
a district school board for an individual exceptional student contract with a nonpublic school, based
on the maximum full-time equivalent earned by the student." Id.at 1097 (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 230.23(4)(m)(7) (1977)).
22. See id. at 1098.
23. Id.
24. Id.The court reasoned:
In compliance with [article IX, § 1], the legislature has established a system of
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quality education, the Scavella court accepted the Florida Legislature's
decision to establish a cap on payments to private schools for the education
of exceptional students deprived of adequate public school facilities
meeting their needs.25
Finally, in Coalitionfor Adequacy & Fairnessin School Funding,Inc.
v. Chiles,26 appellants sought a declaration that the state had failed to
uphold the fundamental right to education by neglecting to allocate
adequate resources for a uniform system of free public schools as provided
for in the Florida Constitution. 27 The court spent considerable time opining
upon the separation of powers doctrine as it applied to the education
article, i.e., whether the legislative or judicial branch had the power to
interpret or define the terms contained therein.28
After acknowledging that the term "adequate provision" had not been
previously defined,29 the court reiterated Escambia'slimited interpretation
of "uniform system"3 and found that the term "uniformity," as it is used
in the constitution, did not mean that all education systems had to be
identical." In so doing, the court stressed that "Florida law now is clear

public schools which must provide "13 consecutive years of instruction... (and)
such instruction for exceptional children as may be required by law." These
schools are funded by governmental sources and nonresident tuition fees, not by
the people utilizing them, except indirectly as taxpayers. The clear implication is
that all Florida residents have the right to attend this public school system for free.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 228.051 (1977)) (citation omitted).
25. See id. at 1099. In these situations, the school board was authorized to "[p]rovide for an
appropriate program of special instruction, facilities, and services for exceptional students ...
[through] the district school system, in cooperation with other district school systems, or through
contractual arrangements with approved private or nonpublic schools ... " Id. at 1098 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 230.23(4)(m)(2) (1977)).
26. 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996).
27. Id. at 402.
28. See id.at 405-06.
29. Id. In agreement with the trial court, the majority noted that "[t]here is no textually
demonstrable guidance in [airticle IX, section 1,by which the courts may decide, a priori, whether
a given overall level of state funds is 'adequate' in the abstract." Id. at 406 (quoting the trial court
opinion).
30. Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 1977))
(finding that the court previously defined "uniform system" as one where "the constituent parts,
although unequal in number, operate subject to a common plan or serve a common purpose").
31. See id. (discussing Fla. Dep't. of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1993)). The court
specifically stated that uniformity was a complicated matter 'involving the special expertise of the
Legislature, its staff, its advisers on public finance, and the Department of Education."' Id.(quoting
Glasser,622 So. 2d at 951 (Kogan, J., concurring)). In addition, the court noted that "each time
the education article has been challenged... some specific funding [program is at] issue." Id; see
also Mills & Mclendon, supranote 8, at 361-67 (discussing Chiles and its role in the constitutional
revisions to the education article).
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that the uniformity clause will not be construed as tightly restrictive, but
merely as establishing a larger framework in which a broad degree of
variation is possible."32 Thus, the court concluded that the Florida
Constitution vests the legislature with "enormous discretion" to provide
for an adequate and uniform school system.33
Interestingly, the dissent in Chiles agreed that it would be "pure
sophistry to suggest that" the purpose of including "uniform" in the
education article was to make every provision of education the same.34
Instead, Justice Anstead wrote, "The major purpose ofthe education article
is to provide for education, not to merely provide for uniformity. '35 Justice
Anstead also agreed with the majority that the legislature-not the
courts-is the governmental body "vested with considerable leeway in
carrying out [the state's education] mandate. 36
Although Escambia, Scavella, and Chiles had already defined the
terminology of article IX, § I37 at issue in the instant case, the instant
majority failed to apply the court's own previous interpretations of these
terms.3" Instead, using principles of constitutional construction, the instant
court determined that article IX, § 1 imposed several requirements that
limited the scope of the legislature's discretionary authority regarding
education.39 The instant court established the principles by which
uniformity would be measured' rather than deferring the determination of

32. Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406 (citing Glasser,622 So. 2d at 950 (Kogan, J.,
concurring)). The
court also reinforced Justice Kogan's concurring statement in Glasserthat the uniformity clause
is not a requirement "that each school district be a mirror image of every other one." Id. According
to the court, such a goal would clearly be impractical. Id.
33. Id.at 408.
34. Id.at 411 (Anstead, J., dissenting in part).
35. Id.Notably, the dissent "reject[ed] the view that the education article contemplates an
inadequate, but uniform, education system." Id.The dissent found that this view was of "great
disservice" to those state citizens who insisted on the inclusion of an education article in the Florida
Constitution. Id.
36. Id.at410.
37. See Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406-07 (discussing Glasserin declining to expand the definition
of uniformity, deferring further definition to the legislature, and clarifying that according to Florida
law, the uniformity clause will be interpreted as establishing a large framework in which much
variation is possible); Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d at 1095, 1098-99 (Fla. 1978)
(explaining that article IX, § 1 confers a right to a free education, and allows the legislature to use
private schools to educate exceptional students); Sch. Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d
834, 838 (Fla. 1977) (defining uniformity).
38. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, 409-10 (Fla. 2006).
39. Id.at 406-07 ("Article IX, section 1(a) is a limitation on the Legislature's power because
it provides both a mandate to provide for children's education and a restriction on the execution of
that mandate."). But see Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406; Sch. Bd.ofEscambiaCounty, 353 So. 2d at 838.
40. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392 at 409-10 (explaining the standards by which to measure
uniformity).
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the scope of uniformity to the legislature, as Chiles and Escambia had
done.
First, the instant court considered the duty article IX, § 1 places on the
legislature.4 ' Applying two standards of constitutional construction,42 the
instant court interpreted article IX, § 1 as both a mandate for the
legislature to provide Floridians with an education system and a directive
to achieve this mandate through a uniform and high quality system of free
public schools. 3 According to the instant court, the term "uniform,"
referenced in the education article, 44 requires state-funded education to
comply with the school accreditation, curriculum, teacher certification, and
academic accountability standards outlined in the education statutes.45
Together, these statutes comprise what the instant court terms a "criterion
of uniformity."'
The instant court briefly addressed the program in Scavella in order to
reject the argument that new uniformity requirements will affect
comparable state education programs that allow students to utilize private
schools for the provision of exceptional student curricula and services.
The instant court distinguished Scavella's reasoning from the instant case
facts because the statute in Scavella was challenged on different
constitutional grounds. 48 Based on the inapplicability of Scavella's
reasoning, the instant court categorically rejected the idea that current
programs utilizing private schools in a similar manner would be affected
41. Id. at 406-08. The court stated that "the issue is what limits the Constitution imposes on
the Legislature." Id.at 398.
42. See id. at 406-08. The court stated that the second and third sentences of article LX, § 1
should be read in pari materia: "[T]he provision should 'be construed as a whole in order to
ascertain the general purpose and meaning of each part; each subsection, sentence, and clause must
be read in light of the others to form a congruous whole."' Id. at 407 (quoting Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886 (Fla. 1996)). The court also analyzed article IX, § 1 through a
second type of constitutional interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,which means .'the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another."' Id.Through this second method, the
instant court came to the same conclusion: By specifying a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and highquality system of free public schools, the article excludes any other means of achieving the
educational mandate. Id.
43. Id. at 405.
44. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
45. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 409-10.
46. See id.(summarizing education statutes that make up the instant court's "criterion of
uniformity").
47. See id.
at 411-12; see also FLA. STAT. § 1002.39 (2005) (establishing the John M. Mckay
Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program); Matthew I. Pinzur & Carol Marbin Miller,
Vouchers'FuturePut in Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2006, at 1B (discussing the state's other
scholarship programs that may be affected by the instant decision).
48. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 411-12. The complaint in Scavella challenged Florida
Statute 230.23(4)(m)(7) under article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution. Id.at 412; supranote 21
and accompanying text.
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by the courts ruling because they are "structurally different from the
' In conclusion the majority determined that the OSP violated the
OSP."49
uniformity standards as well as the education mandate by failing to ensure
that contracting private schools were subject to the same academic
criterion as public schools.50
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Bell criticized the majority's
interpretation of article IX, § 1.s"The dissent warned that by distinguishing
the OSP's provision for "routine" education from Scavella's provision for
"special" education, the majority forced the court into the dangerous
position of individually categorizing education-traditionally a legislative
power.52 Moreover, based on the unambiguous text of article IX, § 1,
Justice Bell concluded that there was no language that would limit the
legislature's ability to use private schools.53
In the instant case, the majority disregarded relevant education
jurisprudence established and relied on by the Escambia, Scavella, and
Chiles courts.54 Instead, using the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
maxim, the instant court restricts article IX, § 1 by incorporating a new
"uniformity criterion" into the existing education mandate,55 thus requiring
the legislature to provide a free, public, and uniform state education
system.56 By narrowly construing the state's education mandate in this
manner, the instant court's decision threatens current scholarship programs
utilizing the private school system,57 such as the McKay Scholarship
Program, and further limits the legislature's ability to repair the state's
failing education system.

49. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 412 (comparing the program for exceptional students at
issue in Scavella to the OSP and determining that the two programs were structurally different).
50. See id.
51. Id.at 423 (Bell, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 423 n.23.
53. Id. at414-15.
54. See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
55. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 407; supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the
uniformity criterion).
56. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 405. The instant court's discussion ofEscambiaand Chiles
is extremely limited even though both cases focused on determining the meaning of the language
in article IX, § 1. Id. at 402-05. The majority used Chiles to introduce a four-category system for
analyzing state educational laws to categorize Florida's current education article. Id. at 404 (quoting
Barbara J. Staros, School FinanceLitigationin Florida:A HistoricalAnalysis,23 STETSONL. REV.
497,498-99 (1994)). In addition, the court called attention to the Chiles court's role in spurring a
constitutional revision of article IX, § 1. Id.at 403-04. The instant court failed to mention the
Chiles court's scrutiny of "adequacy." See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v.
Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,406-07 (Fla. 1996). The instant court referred to Escambiain its discussion
of separation of powers. See Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 405. The instant court used Scavella to
summarily distinguish special programs from that of the OSP. See id. at 411-12.
57. See Pinzur & Miller, supra note 47.
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Historically, the Florida Supreme Court has liberally construed article
IX, § 1, refusing to determine the parameters of "adequacy" and broadly
defining "uniform."58 By failing to consider Escambia and Chiles, the
instant court transformed the meaning of article IX, § 1 entirely." For the
first time,6" the court found that article IX, § 1 "specif[ied] that a system
of free public schools is the means for complying with the mandate to
provide for the education of Florida's children,... [and required] that this
system be 'uniform.'" 6 Thus, when the instant court additionally required
all state-funded education programs to adhere to strict uniformity
standards,62 it abandoned sixty-eight years of state education jurisprudence
that had deliberately limited the duty of the legislature under the education
mandate to the provision of free and public education.63 In fact, since the
original version of the education article was drafted in 1838, the court had
never specified a criterion for uniformity in education legislation.'
After determining that article IX, § 1 required state-funded education
to be "uniform," the instant court created new standards by which
uniformity would be enforced.65 In this regard, the instant court failed to
defer to the legislature, the branch of government formerly charged with
defining "uniform." 66 Instead, the court's newly-crafted definition was
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 405-07; Sch. Bd. of
Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 836-39 (Fla. 1997). The intent of the 1998 revisions to
the education article has been described as follows:
The term "uniform," retained in... § 1, has a long history in Florida, and the
meaning is unchanged by Revision 6. The stated intention of Revision 6 was to
define "adequacy." As revised, the Florida Constitution now requires the
education system to be "uniformly adequate" and meet the new standards
uniformly. .

.

. The intention of the [Constitution Revision Commission],

moreover, was not to modify Florida's already satisfactory uniformity
requirement.
Mills & Mclendon, supra note 8, at 371-73 (footnotes omitted).
59. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 408 (explaining that article IX, § 1 is both a mandate and
a specification of how to fulfill the mandate).
60. See id. at 402-05 (summarizing the history of the education article).
61. Id. at 409.
62. See id. at 409-10 (discussing the uniformity criterion).
63. See supranote 9 and accompanying text; see also Mills & Mclendon, supranote 8, at 355
(stating that Florida courts have concluded that uniformity does not require the state to deliver equal
service or spending to each student).
64. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 402-05 (summarizing the history of the educational article).
65. See id. at 409-10 (analyzing the OSP according to the education statutes).
66. See id. at 413-14 (Bell, J., dissenting); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding,
Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406-08 (Fla. 1996); Sch. Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So.
2d 834, 838-39 (Fla. 1977).
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based on statutes regulating public and private education-specifically
those statutes regulating state oversight of education, school accreditation,
teacher certification, and state curriculum guidelines.67 Using these statutes
as a benchmark for the "uniformity" now required, the instant court struck
down the OSP because private schools failed to adhere to these new
standards of uniformity.68
By narrowly tailoring article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution in this
manner, it is unlikely that Scavella would be found constitutional under the
rubric established by the instant court.6 9 AS stated previously, Scavella
upheld a statute providing for a program of private instruction, "as
prescribed by the state board as acceptable."7 Although it was found to be
a reasonable use of legislative authority in 1978,"' such a broadly-worded
statute would not survive scrutiny today under the instant court's
restrictive reading of article IX. 72 Even the OSP's comprehensive list of
requirements for private school qualification could not withstand the
instant majority's strict uniformity criterion.73 In fact, the majority points
out that eligible private schools have "'widely variant quality standards
and program requirements"' in such areas as state curriculum, teacher
certification, and accreditation requirements.74 If the OSP was unable to
meet these "uniformity" restrictions, it is unclear whether other state
education programs utilizing private schools would survive them.
To be fair by distinguishing Scavella, the instant court attempts to
protect these scholarship programs 75 from the effects of its restrictive
reading of "uniformity., 76 However, the only guidance the court offers
regarding the future constitutionality of Scavella is that such programs
"are structurally different from the OSP. ' 77 The court's failure to explain

67. See Holmes ll1, 919 So. 2d at 409-10.
68. See id.
69. See generally Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1978)
(upholding a private instruction program using less stringent requirements as compared to the
instant case).
70. Id.at 1098 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 230.23(4)(m) (1977)).
71. See id. at 1099.
72. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 409-10 (finding that the OSP violates article IX, § 1 by
failing to ensure that the contracting private schools abide by the uniformity requirements).
73. Id. at 409.
74. Id. at 410 (quoting Florida Dep't of Educ., Private School Accreditation,
http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/PrivateSchools/accreditation.asp (last visited May
29, 2006)).
75. See FLA. STAT. § 1002.39 (2005) (establishing the John M. Mckay Scholarship for
Students with Disabilities); Pinzur & Miller, supranote 47.
76. See Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 411-12.
77. Seeid. at412.
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how the programs are structurally different is noteworthy-such an
analysis would have forced the court to explain how Scavella and similar
programs could achieve the new uniformity standards now required by the
court. 8 As it now stands, the majority's ruling forces future courts to
differentiate those programs that are uniform79 from those that are
not-thereby usurping the legislature's authority.
As a result of its decision, the instant court has called into question the
security of all publicly-funded private school scholarship programs. The
majority's decision has transformed article IX, § 1 from a free public
education mandate into a requirement that publicly-funded private school
scholarship programs meet the same "uniformity" requirements as their
public school brethren. 0 By failing to adequately distinguish Scavella,8 '
the court leaves important scholarship programs, like the McKay program,
vulnerable to future challenges.

78. See id. at 409-10 (discussing uniformity standards). But see id. at 411-12 (mentioning
Scavella, but failing to explain how the court's uniformity standards will affect programs like that
in Scavella).
79. See id. at 423 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 409-10 (majority opinion).
81. See id. at 411-12 (discussing how Scavella is irrelevant to the instant court's opinion, and
summarily denying that programs like that in Scavella will be affected by the instant court's
decision).
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